Page 35 of Mr. and Mrs. Novak

My attention is drawn to a customs operation in Le Havre three weeks ago: a cocaine seizure in a refrigerated container. So far, nothing unusual for a port of that size.

What catches my interest is the sophistication of the concealment system. Customs officers noted that the container panels had been expertly modified, with an access system hidden in the cooling circuit. This was an engineer's work, not that of a typical trafficker.

I dig into the technical details. The container belonged to Fresh Logistics, a Panamanian company created three months earlier. I launch a search on their financial transactions. The structure is complex: three shell companies based in Panama, Singapore, and Dubai. An unusual level of sophistication for simple drug trafficking.

The manifest tells me that container maintenance was handled by ColdTech Services. Studying their history, I discover that their technical director worked for Nexora Trade for three years.

Nexora Trade.

My heart speeds up. I frantically verify the other connections: same bank in Dubai as the shell companies used by Stanford, same circuits.

After weapons in Marseille, now Nexora Trade appears in drug trafficking. Two distinct routes, two different types of trafficking, but the same brain behind it. The technical sophistication is the same, the financial structures follow the same pattern.

I begin to understand the big picture. On one side, weapons mysteriously disappearing after arriving in Marseille. On the other, particularly sophisticated drug trafficking in Le Havre. And in the middle, Stanislas Stanford and Nexora Trade.

I draft an urgent note for my superiors.

Stanislas Stanford isn't just a simple arms trafficker. His organization is much vaster, much more complex than we imagined. Drug trafficking could be the funding source for his other activities.

One thing is certain: this discovery completely changes the dimension of my investigation into Nexora Trade.

I start mapping out suspicious movements.

For weapons, the route is clear: secondary ports in the eastern Mediterranean. Port Said, Limassol, then Marseille.

For drugs, it's different: Santos, Paramaribo, West African ports, then Le Havre.

Two distinct routes, but the same method: "technical" stops in less monitored ports. Each time, the documentation is perfect, too perfect. The manifests are modified with a precision that intrigues me.

Analyzing the documents, I spot their signature. It's subtle: they always use legitimate companies as cover. The declared cargoes vary. Electronic components, industrial parts, medical equipment, perishable goods. But the pattern remains the same.

Something bothers me. The organization is disproportionate for simple trafficking, even significant ones. The logistics are too sophisticated, the resources deployed too substantial.

I think back to the money movements we're monitoring. Stanford isn't just moving goods; he's building a network.

After lunch, I knock on my boss's door.

"Come in and sit down."

He finishes leafing through the preliminary report I left him this morning.

"Two seizures in less than a month," he begins. "Sophisticated weapons in Marseille, cocaine in Le Havre. And in the middle, Nexora Trade. Elaborate."

I explain the key elements: the secondary ports used as transit points, the falsified manifests, the unusual sophistication of operations.

"What strikes me," I add, "is the scale of the organization. These seizures are just the visible part. The resources deployed, the logistical complexity... Nexora Trade has built something much vaster."

He nods, thoughtful.

"You're suggesting a dedicated team?"

"These people are meticulous. To catch them, we need a comprehensive approach. Financial analysts, organized crime experts..."

He closes the file.

"Very well. I'm assigning you cell B4. Mike for the financial part, Valentine on organized crime, Victor for data. You supervise."

I stand up, but he holds me back: